AI in Africa - do we understand its potential.pdf

Tendai Murisa

large_Tendai_Murisa_e7023ee82e.jpg

medium_Tendai_Murisa_e7023ee82e.jpg

small_Tendai_Murisa_e7023ee82e.jpg

thumbnail_Tendai_Murisa_e7023ee82e.jpg

Tendai_Murisa_e7023ee82e.jpg

Much has been written about the potential of an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-led society-wide transformation and in some cases revolution. It has been touted by many as potentially transformative and with the capacity to radicalise how society is organised. However, what kind of progress do we anticipate from AI? To the majority of us, our interaction with AI is through free-access-based platforms such as DeepSeek, WhatsApp’s Meta, ChatGPT and others. Yet there is a lot more to AI than we have yet to understand. I am no expert on AI, and my entry point into this discussion is to bring a non-expert voice to the subject. My interest in this subject is in relation to how AI potentially contributes towards Africa’s quest for democracy and economic transformation. The concerns for democracy and progress in our economy are urgent across the continent. Africa is at some form of a crossroads – whether to deepen or undo democratisation, and on the other hand, to give up on the development project or pursue a different path. AI may play an important role in determining the path Africa will pursue. Do we know much about AI? A few of us might, but the majority do not know about the technology-based revolution that awaits us in both political and economic spheres. As already stated, there is vast literature on the potential of AI, and I have deliberately decided to focus more on the potential challenges it presents.

AI in Africa: Do we understand its potential (or democracy and economic growth)?

Do we understand its potential (for democracy and economic growth)?

large_AI in Africa.png

medium_AI in Africa.png

small_AI in Africa.png

thumbnail_AI in Africa.png

AI in Africa.png

AI in Africa

On the 9th of March, the BBC ran a story about the growing cocaine route to Europe via Ecuador (Wells, 2025). It got me thinking about the increasing risk of the demise of decency towards gangsterism. Rule by might and not by law. Our civilisation, whatever is left of it, faces the risk of being overthrown not by popular insurrection but by a greedy and violent cabal. These cabals come in various shades; the ones reported by the BBC are known as a mafia from Albania. Yet others are in suits and running our governments and corporations. They are united by one vision - grand accumulation. They will not allow anything or anyone including basic laws of decency to stand in their way. They have many tactics. The Albanian mafia, we are told, will shoot if one dares to disagree with them. Other cabals run governments and use prisons as a way of silencing anyone who would dare to criticise them. Some are so popular they steal in the name of the people. There is only one way to describe the situation we are in - the end of decency and widespread acceptance of greed. We are in trouble.

Is there a way out, you may ask? The progressive forces that remain are analysing their situations in isolation from each other. We are not connecting the dots. To others, this is about threats to democracy and the rise of authoritarianism- they are right. To others, it’s about the rise of the lucrative global trade in drugs- they are also right. To others, it’s the new wave around intolerance of groups that had seemingly won the battle, such as the LGBTQI movement. They are right, as well.

We have abandoned analysing how the base (economy) affects politics, culture and society. Could it be that the real problems are in the economy? For us in Africa, it is a challenge of the lack of industrialisation and the weakening of commodity prices. To exacerbate the situation, our productivity levels in agriculture are the lowest when compared to other regions. There is limited value addition- we produce primary goods. The only site of accumulation is within the state. What is left of the private sector mostly depends on providing services to the government. Political power has come to mean economic power. The new elite have connections with government-based actors. The stage is set for the deepening of primitive accumulation. When supplying the government, a US$450.00 laptop might as well just cost US$4,500.00.

In the Global North, on the other hand, many had abandoned manufacturing, preferring instead to outsource to other regions (starting with Mexico, then China, Vietnam, etc.). Today, that strategy has come back to haunt us.

Globalisation has disrupted the global order. Rather than benefiting the authors of the strategy, it has been to China’s benefit and other late industrialisers. The Trump administration is busy trying to undo what was America’s signature project, commonly referred to as the Washington Consensus. The arsenal of tools is based on bullying and gangsterism. They reflect both deep-seated desperation and a very clear misunderstanding of how the world has changed. Whilst the US remains an important player, it is mostly seen as a net consumer of finished products. There is less of ‘made in the USA’ compared to ‘made in China’. Reversing that will take decades of economic stagnation in China and a significant decline in demand for manufactured goods from other regions outside of the United States (US). However, the US will most likely throw everything they have against China. Desperate gangsters- these ones.

Others with lesser political power will wade into the murky waters of criminality. The new drug shipping routes are heavily policed, and yet the drugs still make their way to the United Kingdom and other territories. Criminal money is a more attractive incentive to turn a blind eye, not just by a junior officer but by governments.

While they struggle against illicit drugs in developing countries, poor African countries must contend with the smuggling of their precious minerals (gold and diamonds) at unprecedented levels. The smuggling benefits only a few, especially those in power. Could it be that gangsterism is a new framework to use in understanding power and accumulation in this current moment?

Is there a counter to these new and unprecedented forms of abuse of power? At the beginning of the year, I made a big bet on accountability as an important pillar in strengthening democracy (Murisa, 2025). Admittedly, the façade of ‘democracy’ has led many to think that we have tamed the leviathan called the state. Last year alone, a total of 15 African countries held elections. The results were a mixed bag. In some countries, we saw new political parties winning and, in some, the return of parties and leaders that have been in government before. But there is no tangible evidence so far that all these elections have led to better lives. Elites within and outside of the state have coalesced to diminish the redistribution capabilities of the state. Instead, it continues to serve a tiny minority.

The elections-dominated democracy paradigm has reduced citizens into voters without an adequate appreciation of what the current moment requires - a new form of active engagement with the state and, at times, confronting power using similar, if not more extreme, measures of resistance. There is a need for more on the part of citizens.

Lessons learnt from elsewhere suggest that effective governments are usually found in countries where there are active citizens in various public spaces. Effective governments, where they once existed, rarely governed alone; they did so in partnership with active citizens in various associational platforms.

The struggles of the past era may have led to the assumption that once colonial or apartheid authorities and even post-colonial authoritarian and military regimes have been removed, then democracy will resolve everything. 

The continent has a rich history of struggle up until now. However, the current moment is ambiguous for several reasons: (i) many have been recruited around partisan agendas and will defend their political party even in instances of poor performance, (ii) organised civil society has weakened mobilisation by placing itself at the centre of agitations for change. Citizens have retreated from the public square under the impression that organised civil society has the wherewithal to confront governments and secure change, and (iii) many post-colonial governments have been brutally violent when confronted by dissenting citizens. There are notable levels of fatigue amongst citizens who have been engaged in decades-long protests and abuse of power.

We hold to the firm belief that for democracy to work as it should, citizens should be involved beyond just voting. The citizens must come together in various formal and informal associational and institutional platforms to demand performance from officeholders at both national and local levels. 

We hold to the belief that those holding public office and power must be held to a higher standard of accountability. 

Furthermore, the proposed accountability framework will most likely vastly improve the quality of our democracies across Africa. Only when officeholders are held accountable based on existing standards, frameworks and even commitments they make on their own shall we see improvements in how governments function and ensure effective delivery.

Can the accountability movement respond?

Gangsterism: A New Form of Power

The impact of the sudden closure of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is already being felt across Africa, especially in the social service sector. The top African recipients of United States (US) aid in 2023, according to the Office of Foreign Assistance in the US Department of State (2025), were Ethiopia (US$1.75 billion), Egypt (US$1.45 billion), Somalia (US$1.2 billion), Nigeria (US$1.01 billion), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (US$0.98 billion). The highest funding for HIV treatment went to South Africa (US$250 million), Mozambique (US$239 million), Nigeria (US$220 million), Zambia (US$215 million), and Uganda (US$194 million) (Agbetiloye, 2025). There are several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and nonprofits that were largely supported by USAID. The majority of these have either closed or are in the process of streamlining and cutting down their programs and staffing levels. The closure of USAID has raised the need to revisit funding models and rethink the future of the NGO/nonprofit. Since the mid-1960s, NGOs have risen to be the preferred development partners of Official Development Aid (ODA) agencies. Where the state had been viewed as overly bureaucratic, slow to act and wasteful, NGOs promised the opposite. They were seen as agile, responsive and able to provide services to the underserved at a very low cost. 

However, today, the tide has turned. NGOs have become highly differentiated, ranging from large bureaucracies spanning multiple regions to national and local level entities. The larger ones mimic multinational corporations. They are operational in multiple countries and dominate in terms of revenues and the span of work that they do. Some of these have budgets equal to or higher than those of some third-world countries. These are the entities receiving the majority of official development aid. National and local level NGOs remain precarious with insecure funding and are usually seen as junior partners of the large-scale NGO sector. Regardless of size, the majority depend on funding, usually from ODA agencies and private philanthropy. 

The Future of NGOs

As the field of ‘African philanthropy’ grows, there is an emerging divergence of what the term actually means. There are three notable tendencies in trying to answer this question; first, there is a school of thought which states that African philanthropy is about the growth of a new set of resources (financial and otherwise) that are purely African in terms of source. The second tendency argues for the inclusion of non-African resources provided by philanthropy foundations from elsewhere outside towards causes on the continent. Finally, others argue that the source of funding is not the real issue, but instead, the focus should be on where it is deployed and, in this case, it is African because it has been deployed to causes on the continent. Beyond the contestations around ‘definition by source of resources’, there is a tendency to include all forms of solidarity carried out within communities as part of African philanthropy. These differences are not immediately obvious, but it is essential to mention that if not resolved, the subject or rather African Philanthropy, faces the risk of being superfluous without a coherent agenda. In this brief essay, I propose to carry out a number of things, first to revisit the subject of concepts. What does the term African philanthropy mean? Should we be concerned about the inherent challenges of a loose and broad definition? Secondly, I propose to explore the possibilities of African philanthropy as both a moment/space and a movement towards a rethinking of the continent’s development path. The gatherings under the banner of ‘African Philanthropy’ have grown in number and so has their popularity. Could it be the place for re-imagining Africa’s transformation?

Read the full report written by Tendai Murisa: 

African Philanthropy - Kicking away the scaffold

AI in Africa

Share

Authors

Download full article

Other relevant insights